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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a divorce action and includes hearings subsequent 
to trial to fix child support and alimony payments. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. Respondent was granted 
a Decree of Divorce from Appellant on the grounds of mental 
cruelty. No award of alimony or child support was made at the 
time of trial, due to Appellant's temporary inability to earn 
income. In a subsequent hearing brought on by Respondent, 
Respondent was granted an award of child support in the amount 
of $700.00 per month ($350.00 per month for each of the parties' 
two minor children) and an award of alimony in the amount of 
$300.00 per month. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the striking or reduction to nominal of 
the award of alimony and a reduction of child support payments 
from $350.00 to $200.00 per month per child. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on June 10, 1955. Two minor 
children of the parties (Pearson, age 17, and-Carter, age 10) 
reside with Respondent. 
Respondent is a partner in a small business. Appellant 
is a thoracic surgeon. Appellant established his practice in 
Utah; but in 1975 an emotional disorder ended this practice. 
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In March, 1976, after the divorce, Appellant was able to resume 
his medical practice in California. 
The trial court found Respondent's annual taxable income 
to be $11,200 [R., p. 89, ~ 8]. Appellant disputes this find-
ing. The trial court found Appellant's annual taxable income 
to be $66,692.00 [R. p. 89, II 6]. Appellant disputes this find-
ing. 
ARGUMENT 
1. IN FIXING ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY, THE TRIAL COURT DID 
NOT USE THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD ANNOUNCED BY THIS COURT. 
A. THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT IN FIXING A 
REASONABLE AWARD OF ALIMONY INCLUDE: 1) THE FINANCIAL CONDI-
TIONS AND NEEDS OF THE WIFE, 2) THE ABILITY OF THE WIFE TO 
PRODUCE SUFFICIENT INCOME FOR HERSELF, AND 3) THE ABILITY OF 
THE HUSBAND TO PROVIDE SUPPORT. 
In Nace v. Nace, 107 Ariz. 411, 489 P.2d 48, 50 (1971), 
cited with approval by the Court in English v. English, No. 
14760, filed June 2, 1977, --- Utah 2d ---, the court observed 
that the criteria to be considered in fixing a reasonable award 
for alimony include the financial conditions and needs of the 
wife, the ability of the wife to produce sufficient income for 
herself, and the ability of the husband to provide support. ~ 
English, supra, the Court noted that the standard appropriate 
to fixing alimony differs from the standard to be employed in 
dividing the assets of a married couple on their divorce: 
The standard utilized by the trial court 
[to fix an award of alimony], viz., the length of 
the marriage and the contributions of each to 
their joint financial success, is not an appropriate 
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measure to determine alimony. There is a distinction 
between the division of assets accumulated during 
the.marriage, _which should be distributed upon an 
equita~le basis, and the post-marital duty of support 
and maintenance. 
The purpose of alimony is to provide 
support for the wife and not to inflict 
punitive damages on the husband. Alimony 
is not intended as a penalty against the hus-
band nor reward to the wife. . . . [Citing 
2 Nelson Divorce and Annulment (2d Ed. 1961 
Rev. Vol.) § 14.06, pp. 11-12.] [Emphasis 
added.] 
3 
B. THE CRITERIA USED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN FIXING AN 
AWARD OF ALIMONY ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED 
BY THIS COURT. 
The trial court, in awarding alimony to Respondent, 
applied a standard inconsistent with that announced by this 
Court. In its Memorandum Opinion the trial court states: 
... as far as alimony is concerned, the Court 
feels it would be inequitable at this time and 
under the present circumstances to award either 
the full $500.00 per month requested [as alimony] 
by [Respondent], or no alimony or the token ali-
mony requested by [Appellant]. It is true that 
the [Respondent] through enterprise and perhaps 
necessity, does have a far better income than the 
average female this Court sees. Moreover, the 
Court acknowledges that in one sense [Resporident] 
does not "need" alimony in that she probably could 
subsist without it, and in fact has done so for 
approximately the last two years. However, and 
despite the foregoing, the Court feels wholly 
justified in making the alimony award it has and 
believes this award is amply supportable under 
the guidelines laid down in the numerous decisions 
of our Supreme Court. In making that award the 
Court has considered, among other things, (1) the 
length of this marriage, (2) [Respondent's] assi-
stance to [Appellant] during the lean years from 
June 1955 to 1970 and during which [Appellant] 
prepared himself for his present profession of 
cardiovascular surgery and particularly, (3) the 
present disparity in the [Respondent's] and 
[Appellant's] income and the disparity of their 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
income potential. [R., p. 71-72, emphasis added.] 
It is clear that the trial court has committed the very error 
warned against in English, supra, by confusing the standard 
appropriate to division of assets with the standard appropriate 
to awarding alimony. The considerations relied upon by the 
trial court are precisely those proscribed in English. 
The trial court's award of alimony is designed to reward 
Respondent and penalize Appellant. The trial court has attemp-
ted to bring the parties' "income potential" into parity, 
without reference to Respondent's needs. Shall Appellant be 
penalized because he is a surgeon, without reference to 
Respondent's needs? Shall Respondent be rewarded because she 
is not a surgeon, without reference to her needs? Signifi-
cantly, the trial court stated in its Memorandum Opinion, 
quoted above, that establishing parity of "income potential" 
was a "particularly" important aspect of its deliberations. 
2. UNDER THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD THE AWARD OF ALIMONY 
SHOULD BE STRICKEN OR REDUCED TO NOMINAL AND THE AWARD OF CHILD 
SUPPORT SHOULD BE REDUCED TO $200.00 PER MONTH PER CHILD. 
A. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT RESPONDENT IS CAPABLE OF 
PRODUCING SUFFICIENT INCOME TO MEET HER NEEDS. 
As the trial court's Memorandum Opinion, cited above, 
tacitly admits, if Respondent's request for alimony were con-
sidered under the appropriate standard (her financial condition 
and needs and her ability to produce sufficient income, toge-
ther with Appellant's ability to pay), an award of alimony 
would be inappropriate in this case. 
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The trial court found that Respondent's annual taxable 
income was $11,200 [R. p. 89, ~ 8]. The evidence of record, 
however, does not support this finding, which was based on 
Respondent's 1976 income. During the first quarter of 1977 
Respondent was paid a gross salary of $1,700 per month and 
on this basis her 1977 annual taxable income is $20,400.[T., 17). 
Respondent's business accountant testified that 1) Respon-
dent's partnership would not be capable of continuing to pay 
her a salary of $20,400 annually based on the record of the 
partnership during the first three months of 1977, which showed 
a $1,700 loss to the partnership; and 2) that Respondent's 
partnership would be capable of paying her an annual salary 
of $11,200 [T., p. 15). On cross examination, however, this 
testimony was found to be unreliable according to the accoun-
tant's own standards of income projection: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
Mr. Erickson, are some months better than other 
months in the business of Wild Flower? 
Yes, they are. 
The first three months are rather slow, aren't 
they? 
The first three months are, compared to the 
final three months of the year, are slower. 
In fact, in December of '76, there was a profit 
for that month of $3,200 alone, wasn't there? 
That is correct. 
And so the loss of $1,700 for three months is 
really kind of meaningless without taking a look 
at the projection for the last three months to 
compare with it. 
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A: You would have to take into account the other nine 
months' operations to make a projection. 
Q: So, your projection, when Mr. Sessions asked you, 
was on the first three months. You can't really 
base it on three months, can you? 
A: No, you can't. You have to base it on prior years' 
operations. [T.,p. 17] 
The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from this testimony is 
that despite the increase in Respondent's salary in 1977, the 
partnership's first-quarter loss of $1,700 is not unusual in 
light of the previous year's overall operation, since the 
slower first-quarter is balanced by the more brisk final quar-
ter of the year. This is a picture of a healthy business 
partnership whose increasing earnings are being distributed, 
at least in Respondent's case, in the form of a higher salary. 
The record shows that Respondent's present income is $1,700 
per month. The testimony of Respondent's accountant rebutting 
that evidence was based on an analysis of only the first-quar-
ter of the partnership's business year, an analysis which the 
accountant himself acknowledged as deficient. 
During 1976 Respondent was able to meet her needs and 
those of the parties' minor children on an income of $20,873, 
which included her salary plus a $9,000 draw upon her partner-
ship equity [T., p. 13]. No evidence was adduced showing that 
the standard of living enjoyed by Respondent at this income 
level was substantially lower than that enjoyed by Respondent 
during the marriage. In 1977 Respondent's salary increased 
to a figure of $20,400. Therefore, Respondent's present salar 
together with an award of child support in the sum of $400 per 
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month ($200 per month per child), will provide her with an 
income level of $25,200, well above her 1976 level. To award 
Respondent an additional $300 per month in alimony would provide 
her a $3,600 annual windfall unjustified in terms of her needs. 
B. APPELLANT IS PRESENTLY CONSTRAINED IN HIS ABILITY TO 
CONTRIBUTE TO RESPONDENT'S SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE. 
The trial court found Appellant's overhead expenses in 
the operation of his medical practice to be $16,692, using as 
its yardstick a figure of 20% of Appellant's total income 
[R., p. 89, 11 6]. This estimate of Appellant's overhead expense 
is grossly inaccurate in that it does not include Appellant's 
costs for the purchase of medical malpractice insurance. 
Appellant is a thoracic surgeon, a profession exposed to 
the threat of medical malpractice lawsuits. Appellant was not 
covered by medical malpractice insurance at the time of the 
hearing, but was in the process of obtaining such insurance. 
Appellant testified that he had not previously been able to 
afford such insurance coverage and estimated annual premiums 
for malpractice insurance to be $30,000 [T., p. 39]. 
The "20% overhead expense allocation" adopted by the trial 
court [R., p. 89, t 6] does not include malpractice insurance 
premiums. Further, that 20% figure was derived from Appellant's 
1976 overhead expenses, which were unusually low. Appellant 
practiced for only 9 months during 1976; in the first three 
months of his practice (March through May, 1976) he was afforded 
the opportunity to share offices with a colleague at no overhead 
cost whatever. The "overhead expense allocation" referred to 
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by the trial court actually represents only six months' opera-
ting expenses and is a serious underestimation of Appellant's 
annual overhead. 
Appellant estimated his annual overhead expense, including 
malpractice premiums, to be $54,600 [Exhibit 8-D]. The impact 
of the trial court's award of alimony and child support on 
Appellant is reflected by applying Appellant's overhead expense, 
together with the alimony and child support awarded to the 
Respondent, to Appellant's total annual income, found to be 
$ 8 3 I 4 61. 0 0 [ R . I p . 8 9 I ~[ 6 l : 
Total income 
Less overhead (including 
malpractice premiums) 
Less annual alimony ($300/mo.) 
and child support ($700/mo.) 
Income remaining for 
Appellant 
$83, 461. 00 
(54,600.00) 
(12,000.00) 
$16,861.0o* 
In guag ing Appellant's ability to contribute to Respondent' 
support and maintenance, the trial court 1) took no consideratic 
of malpractice premiums in estimating Appellant's overhead 
expenses, and 2) underestimated Appellant's overhead expenses 
by relying on a year when said expenses were unusually low. To 
burden Appellant with unjustified alimony payments under these 
conditions could postpone his purchase of malpractice insurance, 
endangering his own financial well being and jeopardizing his 
* Since child support is taxable to Appellant, he would pay 
taxes on $25,261.00. 
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future ability to support the parties' minor children. 
C. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT AN AWARD OF $350.00 PER 
MONTH PER CHILD AS CHILD SUPPORT; SAID AWARD CONTAINS A HIDDEN 
AWARD OF ALIMONY. 
It is clear that the trial court, in derrogation of the 
standard announced by this Court, has attempted to bring the 
spendable incomes of the parties into parity. It has employed 
9 
both child support and alimony awards as tools of equalization. 
The award of $350.00 per month per child is unusually high. 
The record does not show that $700 per month should reasonably 
be spent solely to satisfy the needs of the two minor children 
residing with Respondent. It would appear that the trial court 
has included in its child support award a hidden alimony pay-
ment. The trial court has attempted to determine what total 
amount, paid from Appellant to Respondent, will bring the 
parties' spendable incomes into parity, and has then allocated 
that amount between child support and alimony without reference 
to the needs of the children or the Respondent. 
In Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132, this 
Court stated that awards of alimony and child support are to 
be based on separate grounds: 1) support of the divorced wife, 
and 2) support of the minor children. 
As indicated hereinabove, there is a vari-
ance between the findings and the decree with 
respect to alimony and support money. The find-
ings show an intention to award both, while the 
decree refers to "alimony" for the "support of 
the children." Alimony relates to support of the 
divorced wife, and support money relates to the -
compensation to a spouse for the s~port of minor 
Chlldren. (172 P.2d at 135, emphasis added.] 
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Appellant contends that a child support award of $350 per 
month per child is not justified by the record (or, indeed, by 
any finding of the trial court) in terms "related[d] to the 
compensation to a spouse for the support of minor children." 
Further, Appellant doubts whether it would be in the best 
interests of the children to spend $700 per month solely for 
their needs and desires. 
Appellant contends that a reasonable sum to be awarded 
Respondent for the support of the parties' two minor children 
is $200.00 per month per child. 
CONCLUSION 
In awarding alimony to Respondent, the trial court failed 
to employ the standard announced by this Court. Alimony was 
awarded without reference to Respondent's needs, her ability 
to produce sufficient income, and Appellant's constrained 
ability to contribute to her support and maintenance. Under 
the appropriate standard, an award of alimony is unjustified 
and said award should be stricken or reduced to nominal. 
The award of child support is excessive and unsupported 
by the record. It apparently includes a hidden award of ali-
mony which is intended to "spill over" to Respondent's benefit 
without reference to the needs of the children. A reasonable 
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award of child support in this case is the sum of $200 per 
month per child. 
DATED this 22nd day of DECEMBER, 1977. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Attorney for Appellant 
516 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Clark W. Sessions, Esq., Watkiss & Campbell, 12th Floor, 310 
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, this 22nd day 
of DECEMBER, 1977. 
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